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TRUSTS
IMPERFECT GIFT AS A TRUST
The owner of certain stocks placed them in a safety deposit box
to which his wife had access and to which she went three times. Thir-
teen witnesses, some against interest, testified that he had declared the
stock belonged to his wife. All stocks were in his name, unassigned and
unindorsed. The court held that as between donor and donee, docu-
mented choses in action generally may be the subject of gift without
assignment or indorsement. To make an effective gift, however, of
such choses in action, transferring all the property rights which they
represent, there must be a present intention to give plus delivery. The
court found that the owner of the stock had intended his wife to have
the securities and that he supposed he had effectuated his desire, but that
he had failed in his purpose because there was not the necessary com-
pliance with the law respecting consummation of a gift-no delivery.
Bolles v. The Toledo Trust Co., Ex's. et. al., 132 Ohio St. 21,
4 N.E. (2d) 917, 7 Ohio Op. 6o (936).
Since the case of Ex Parte Pye, 18 Vis. 140 (I811), it is con-
sidered settled that no consideration is necessary in order to create a
valid trust. The delivery of a writing, insufficient as a deed, purporting
to make a gife of a bond without delivery of the subject matter to the
donee was held equivalent to a self-declaration of trust. Morgan v.
Malleson, L.R. IO Eq. 475 (1870); Richardson v. Richardson, L.R.
3 Eq. 686 (1867). After these decisions, the court of equity became
more and more reluctant to aid disappointed donees by converting de-
fective gifts into self-declarations of trust. Heartley v. Nicholson, L.R.
19 Eq. 233; 44 L.G. Ch. 277; 31 L.T. 821; 23 W.R. 374 (1874);
Richards v. Delbridge, L.R. 18 Eq. I 1; 43 L.J. Ch. 459, 22 W.R.
584 (1874).
Delivery of the subject matter is essential to the validity of a gift.
Bryant v. Parker, 188 Ark. 598, 66 S.W. (2d) io61 (1934); Perry
v. First Nat. Bank, 228 Mo. App. 486, 68 S.W. (2d) 927 (1934).
Delivery must put. the subject matter of the gift beyond the power of
the donor to revoke. Brooks v. Brooki, 54 Ga. App. 276, 187 S.E. 687
(1936); Pabst v. Haman, 12o N.J. Eq. 451, 185 Adt. 500 (1936).
Delivery to third person for purposes of delivering to the donee consti-
tutes that third person an agent for that purpose, and there is a valid
gift if the res is delivered to the donee before revocation or death of
the donor. Green v. Hyzes,. 183 Pac. 568, [Cal. App.] (1919);
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Smith v. Simmons, 99 Coo. 227, 61 Pac. (2d) 589 (1936); Gellert
v. Bank of Calif., Nat. -ssn., 107 Ore. 162, 214 Pac. 377 (1923). A
gift may also be completed by delivery to a third person as trustee or
completed without delivery if held by the donor as trustee to the use of
the donee. In reRusk's Estate, 206 Ill. App. 518 (1918); Goodan v.
Goodan, 184 Ky. 79, 211 S.. 423 (1919); and such a gift is not
revocable by the donor unless he has reserved power to revoke or has
obtained the consent of those beneficially interested, Schoellkopf v.
Marine Trust Co. of Buffalo, 242 App. Div. II, 272 N.Y.S. 613
(i934); 1lderman v. 4lderman, 178 S.C. 9, I81 S.E. 897 (i935);
Skillin v. Skillin, 133 Me. 347, 177 Ad. 706 (935); Fidelity & Co-
lumbia Trust Co. v. IVilliams, 268 Ky. 671, 105 S.W. (2d) 814
(937). A "gift" is distinguished from a "voluntary trust" in that the
thing itself passes to the donee where there is a gift while in the case of
a trust the actual, beneficial or equitable tide passes to the cestui que trust,
while legal title is transferred to a third person or retained by the person
creating it to hold for the purpose of the trust. Lindner and Boyden
Bank v. IVardrop, io N.E. (2d) 144 (Ill., 1937); Miles v. Miles,
78 Kans. 382, 96 Pac. 481 (19o8); Littig v. Mt. Calvary Protestant
Church, ioi Md. 494, 61 Ad. 635 (1905); Cox v. Hill and Sprigg,
6 Md. 274 (1854); Flanders v. Bland,, 45 Ohio St. IO8, 12 N.E.
321 (1887).
There has been some confusion on the part of courts resulting from
failure to distinguish between situations involving agency and those
pertaining to trusts. In Smith v. Simmons, supra, the court held that
the one in possession was an agent of the donor, since he did not have
legal tide which must necessarily be in him as trustee. However, in a
recent Ohio case, Streeper v. Myers, 132 Ohio St. 322, 7 N.E. (2d)
554 (1937), on very similar facts, the court reached the conclusion
that there was a good gift in trust. There was no indication that the
bank where the res of the gift was deposited had been transferred legal
title to hold as trustee, nor had the donor clearly manifested an intention
to make a self-declaration of trust. The courts ignored the same obstacles
and found gifts of trust in Cazallis v. Ingraham, i 19 Me. 240, I 10
Atl. 359 (1920); Grant Trust and Savings Co. v. Tucker, 49 Ind.
App. 345, 96 N.E. 487 (19 1). Gifts are most frequently challenged
after the death of the donor, and in order to make them valid, when
delivered to a third persons, it is necessary for the courts to follow the
theory of creation of a trust, rather than delivery to an agent, since
death of the donor before the execution of his intention to make a gift
operates as a revocation of the agency. Gellert v. Bank of Calif., Nat.
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Ass'n., supra; Green v. Hynes, supra; Smith v. Simmons, supra; Farm-
ers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Winthrop, 238 N.Y. 477, 144 N.E. 686
(1924). This, however, should not influence the court, because there
is no principle of equity which will perfect an imperfect gift, and a court
of equity will not impute a trust where a trust was not in contemplation.
In re Ashman, 223 Pa. 543, 72 At. 899 (I909); Trubey v. Pease,
240111. 513, 88 N.E. 1005 (19o9); Flanders v. Blandy, supra.
Mere expression of a wish to give, unaccompanied by acts executing
the purpose, will not be enforced, but acts or words manifesting a present
execution of the donor's intention to give may be sustained by means of
a trust if all the essential elements thereof are present. Ginn's 4dm'x. v.
Ginn's Adm'r., 236 Ky. 217, 32 S.W. (2d) 971 (1930); American
Bible Soc. v. Mortgage Guarantee Co., 217 Cal. 9, 17 Pac (2d) 105
(1932). In a self-declaration of trust, there is no absolute need of
delivery either of the trust property or of a document declaring the
trust. Murray v. O'Hara, 195 N.E. 909 (Mass., 1935). Where
testator deposited money in the bank and declared to friends that it
belonged to her son, the court refused to hold it a trust on the grounds
that she had merely indicated an intention to create a trust in the future.
Smithwick v. Bank of Corning, 95 Ark. 463, 130 S.W. 166 (191o).
On the other hand, where the settlor signed an instrument certifying
that he had given certain lands to his son, his words seemed to indicate
an attempt to make a gift, but nothing was delivered and the court
held this a valid self-declaration of trust. Matter of Brown, 252 N.Y.
366, 169 N.E. 612 (930). Also an insured's written assignment to
his wife of life policies payable to his estate was held sustainable, without
delivery, as a trust. In re Mackintosh's Estate, 14o N.Y. Misc. 12,
249 N.Y.S. 534 (1931)-
In the principal case, with no delivery to the donee, no gift was
made. It is consistent with fundamental principles of the law that an
invalid gift should not be converted into a trust merely to enable the
donee to take. However, the testimony of the thirteen witnesses, some
testifying against interest, as to the declaration of the donor would indi-
cate as clearly as the instrument in Matter of Brown, supra, that the
donor had manifested his intention to presently establish a self-declaration
of trust. If the donor created a valid trust, it is novel to suggest that it
could not take effect because it was not also a valid gift.
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